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Abstract: This talk will focus on cognitive processes between conscious and subconscious awareness 
in order to present a slightly different definition of narrative. Rather than simply accepting that 
narrative is a conscious selection of stories subject to bias, I will argue that biases are the primary 
structure of narrative and that their success is explained in painfully simple terms. 
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‘I suppose a quick anecdote is out of the question?’ he croaked. 
Conina sighed. ‘There’s more to life than narrative, you know.’ 
‘Sorry. I lost control a little, there.’ (Pratchett, 1989)  
In his fantasy book series set in the Discworld, writer Terry Pratchett referred to the imperative 
of narrative as a force in nature. At its simplest, his characters respond to events in particular ways 
according to (stereo) type; at the meta-scale it is presented as an ontological structure that guides 
societies and larger historical events. 
It sounds better when you tell the story of it: when a wagon or coach crashes, regardless of the 
context, there must come from it a burning, rolling wheel. And, of course, million in one chances 
happen all the time. 
Treated superficially such narrative archetypes or rhetorical anecdotes are simply that: entities 
that have no more importance that their immediate effect. But I will argue that there is very little that 
is more important than narrative when we construct realities cognitively.  
In fact, the claim is that the world of stories is more important than reality. There really is a 
narrative imperative as Pratchett suggested. 
1. We Do Not Live in a Cartesian Universe 
Firstly, we have to be wary of skepsicentrism, the supremacy of ‘conscious’ thought over any 
other form of human knowing. In particular other forms of coming to know and even knowledge 
exist. Descartes famously articulated the essentialist view in terms of becoming through thinking but 
it’s simply not accurate when we consider recent findings in cognitive neuroscience [1]. We are only 
aware of about 10% of the cognitive activity in our brains [2–4]. We use confirmation bias, preferred 
selection [5] and whole range of belief-based thinking [6]—most of which we are unaware of. When 
we become aware of it we use a further set of techniques to reconcile what we actually thought with 
what we think we thought [7,8].  
To summarise: ‘we’ (what we think we are) are necessary but insufficient components in the 
construction of our own ideas and conceptions [9].  
This talk will focus on these ‘between’ conscious mechanisms in order to present a slightly 
different definition of narrative. Rather than simply accepting that narrative is a conscious selection 
of stories subject to bias, I will argue that biases are the primary structure of narrative and that they 
are pseudo-fractal, acting at different scales in any narrative. 
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Motivated reasoning, for example, is one such mechanism and this has a very strong storytelling 
component to it. We can readily hold multiple truths [10] and contradictions in our minds. We have 
to maintain our self-perceptions [11,12] but we extend such ‘storytelling’ (or confabulation) to 
construct our realities too. This is not a superficial filter we apply to reality—it is our reality: red is 
not red [13]; We really do not know ourselves [14] and what we think of as our core personality traits 
change over time [15]. 
The trick to achieving all this ‘mediation of truth’ is to make sure that we can arrive at a reality 
we find acceptable: 
“people are more likely to arrive at conclusions they want to arrive at, but their ability to do so is 
constrained by their ability to construct reasonable justifications for these conclusions” [16]. 
In order to construct a ‘reasonable justification’ people use narrative structures and storytelling 
as forms of knowledge—story epistemes. Central to making this argument is the ways in which 
information is used. 
2. Information Is Not Enough/Too Much 
The simply model of the transfer of information is not enough to explain the transfer of concepts. 
The model doesn’t claim to either. As we discuss some complex concept or difficult ethical dilemma 
a huge range of ‘meta-information’ is required, whether this is existing knowledge; cultural 
situatedness; responsive adaption to the other person’s reactions; projection of position; etc.  
The argument here does not propose that these metalinguistic events are epiphenomenal 
‘wonder tissue’ [17]—it is perfectly possible for them to be tangible and realisable entities at some 
pragmatic level in sense of James and Landauer [18,19]. The issue here is not their nature, but their 
number. At present, it is not possible to state whether the amount of information to be accounted for 
is computable or simulatable at any lower ‘resolution’ than the total system itself. It is a P versus NP 
problem [20]. 
And that leads to the next problem—humans simply do not have the ‘bandwidth’ to process a 
fraction of this information. This is considered, in evolutionary terms, to be one of the primary drivers 
for mechanisms such as cognitive bias, motivated reasoning, justified belief and others. To put it 
bluntly, our brains use about 20% of our body’s energy at a resting state (40% when we are really 
thinking hard  
So it is hardly surprising that we have developed strategies to optimise the use of this entropy-
gulping grey matter. If you are making notes on this or even just scrolling up and down your interface 
in annoyance you are using your environment to offload some cognitive activity [21,22].  
And interestingly, we are also more likely to ‘lie’ when we have lower cognitive resources 
available [6].  
All of which suggests that there is some optimisation between information density and our 
efficient/effective use of it. That is, between too much or too little information ‘processing’ there exists 
a zone within which Homo Sapiens can operate (effectively) whilst still maintaining an acceptable 
energy usage (efficiently). Such optimal zones of operation can be seen throughout nature: Dawkins 
referred to this as the “survival of the stable” [23] and we see such optimisations occurring regularly 
in human interactions. In design the MAYA principle underlies successfully creative products in that 
they are optimised between being different enough but not so different they are difficult to ‘process’ 
[24,25]. It is argued that narrative operates, and indeed ‘is’, human concpetualisation in this zone of 
optimal effect and energy use.  
Narrative, it could be said, is a naturally occurring means (mode?) by which entropy increases 
at an acceptable rate to human beings. 
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3. Characteristics Arising from an Optimised Conceptual Narrative 
This zone of optimisation has to be understood, not as processing or computation of information, 
but as human use of information. As previously noted, our essentialist view of thinking fools us into 
believing in a linear or normative pattern to its structure—that we interact, then think, then at some 
point may recall this as an historical incident. But the actual process of cognition works in a very 
different way. Our memories are most definitely not essentialist and rely on re-cognition rather than 
linear recall [8,26]. As a further example, we still view knowledge as acquiring, collecting and 
building, not reconstruction—this is known as the acquisition metaphor [27]. Each and every time 
we have a thought or memory we are re-creating it—not recalling it or even processing it.  
This emergence of conception through cognition is not quite the same as processing or 
computing. Rather, if it is, it suffers precisely the same problem as the problem of concept transfer—
it is (currently) a P vs. nP problem. The utility of human use is entirely contingent on circumstance, 
availability of energy and a whole range of other relative factors. It is a non-normative, situated for 
of use whose purpose and value is inter-dependent on its own situation. It is this very fuzziness of 
human use that allows us to retain ‘superpositions’ of information—to hold contradictions as  
valid truths. 
The only way to deal with such a contingent complexity is through conceptualisation—an ill-
defined cognitive, socio-psycho process. The emergence of such conceptions is dependent on their 
own efficiency and effectiveness, meaning they must be: 
4. Quick and Easy to Communicate and Conceptualise 
This is necessary because of the need to optimise the complexity/energy gradients required to 
generate the concept. Doing this allows a lot more ‘space’ to do things with the narrative. For example, 
see Dawkins for (all internet) memes [23]. Or consider basic, existing, embodied cognitive schema, 
such as ‘light is good; dark is bad’;  
“In the middle of the journey of our life I found myself within a dark woods where the straight way 
was lost.” 
Such ‘simple’ concepts are exceptionally powerful because they take very little information to 
convey them and are easily conceptualised, not simply thought about. Once a conceptual metaphor 
is transferred (i.e., you ‘get it’) you cannot remove it. Sticky stories survive—others simply die.  
5. Acceptable to Our Preferences, Worldview and Beliefs 
For example, metal and wood at the same temperature do not feel the same temperature [28]. 
This type of experiential knowledge can conflict with other forms of knowledge and we can 
intellectualise and understand that what we feel is not necessarily the same as how we might describe 
it for the purposes of creating a scientific or engineering model. But what is more interesting is that 
even graduate physics students will make use of the experiential knowledge as a ‘lie’ to inform the 
intellectual knowledge. We only make use of knowledge that fits with our worldview. Narrative 
emerges from, aligns with, and can only exist due to, emotional states and belief. As Bohm suggested,  
“Reality is what we take to be true. What we take to be true is what we believe… What we believe 
determines what we take to be true.”  
The extents to which we are prepared to act based on obvious falsehoods or where little 
evidences is available to support our beliefs are often incredible. And at no point do we even consider 
that we might be lying to ourselves—we don’t need to because we are too good at pretending it’s not 
a lie: 
“…ethical evaluations are not a dichotomy between honest and dishonesty but rather a continuum 
stretching between the two ends.” [6] 
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6. Summary 
Much of this is already well established in a variety of disciplines and domains. Memes, sticky 
ideas, conceptual metaphors, rhetoric, etc. have all been around for a very long time and research 
into how these are used in politics, business, design, and many other. 
And in many ways this sums up the ‘multiple readings of reality’ [29] we face, not as objects in 
the world, but as objects who create themselves continuously in their own realities. We are no more 
able to control our own constructions of reality than we are to control the bacterial populations in our 
gut. But we can elect to influence it—to be aware of it, reflect on it and, ultimately, to act on it. 
“That is all as it should be, for in a question like this truth is only to be had by laying together many 
varieties of error.” [30] 
Our human ability to ‘lay together varieties of error’ allows us to do incredible things—good 
and bad; stupid and wise. Truth or ‘right’ or good has no preferential transport route in any 
storytelling. As Mark Twain advised, “Never let the truth get in the way of a good story.” 
It’s the story that matters. It’s the optimal conceptual structure to help us navigate a perceptually 
rich environment; to retain a culturally rich social knowledge; and to continually reconstruct ideas of 
what the world might be. 
The world of ideas and stories is the only world there is. 
Let’s leave the last word to Pratchett: 
“The stories don't want you to think, they just wanted you to believe what you were told...” The Wee 
Free Men 
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